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Abstract
In the Continued Pursuit of Stadium Initiatives Following Past Failures: 
An Analysis of the Los Angeles Farmers Field Proposal
Superficially, it appears paradoxical that the city of Los Angeles does not have a National Football League (NFL) fran-
chise, especially considering the city’s status as the second-largest media market in the United States.  Currently, the An-
schutz Entertainment Group (AEG) is leading a proposal for a new, state-of-the-art, 68,000-seat outdoor football stadium 
in downtown Los Angeles, along with a significant renovation of the neighboring convention center, in order to return the 
NFL to the city.  According to official documents, the $1.2-billion project would be financed completely through private 
investment (Pamer & Healy, 2012).  In addition to the familiar criticisms aimed at nearly every major sports facility pro-
posal, pro-stadium officials must disassociate the present plan from past Los Angeles football endeavors.  In this study, we 
analyzed AEG’s organizational perception management strategies through a content analysis of the proposed stadium’s of-
ficial website and authorized social media outlets.  Four primary themes emerged from an analysis of website social media 
communications.  These themes represent AEG’s primary communicative objectives and include: legitimating the project; 
educating citizens about the project; connecting to Angelenos; and calling potential advocates of the plan into action.  Im-
plications of this study and directions for future research are provided.
Keywords: stadium campaigns, Los Angeles, city image, sport finance, social media, organizational perception 
management
Introduction
One challenge for professional sport organizations 
seeking a new or renovated stadium is to convince influ-
ential stakeholders within their communities (e.g., vot-
ers, local government, private investors) to support their 
projects, financially and otherwise. To meet this challenge, 
these teams must demonstrate the positive contributions 
they make to their local municipalities. Sport teams com-
peting in aging facilities justify their requests for new 
facilities by citing multiple anticipated benefits to fans 
and to the team, including wider concourses, improved 
sightlines, overall aesthetics, more accommodating access 
points, and increased revenues (Rosentraub, 2010). How 
(and whether) such benefits to the team and fans translate 
into financial and nonpecuniary benefits to the city and its 
wider community is often disputed (Zimmerman, 2008). 
Still, teams seeking public financing for new or renovated 
facilities often benefit from using the threat of moving to 
another city as leverage (deMause & Cagan, 2008), dem-
onstrating the existence of a widely-held assumption that 
teams are of value to their cities.
There is a litany of case studies examining communities 
in which public stadium financing has been debated (e.g., 
Brown & Paul, 2002; Mondello & Anderson, 2004; Mon-
dello, Schwester, & Humphreys, 2009), but less attention 
has been directed to cities where privately funded stadi-
ums have been proposed. Certainly, the prospect of allo-
cating tax revenues, issuing tax-exempt bonds, or provid-
ing infrastructure is likely to garner more attention from 
local citizens, but the privately funded stadium proposal 
is not immune to public reproach, as discussed further in 
the case highlighted by this paper.
City officials seeking to lure an existing or expansion 
professional sport team with a new, state-of-the-art facil-
ity have often been met with public resistance, particularly 
when such cities have a history of failed professional sport 
endeavors. For example, in 2007, the 18,500-seat Sprint 
Center opened in downtown Kansas City, with the pri-
mary purpose to catalyze economic growth through the 
acquisition of a professional hockey or basketball team 
(Chapman, 2006; Molinari, 2005). At the same time, the 
National Hockey League’s (NHL) Pittsburgh Penguins 
were in the process of negotiating for a new publicly fund-
ed arena. After Penguins officials declared an impasse with 
the city of Pittsburgh, the Penguins made a heavily publi-
cized visit to Kansas City to explore the possibility of re-
locating (“KC Puts,” 2007). Ultimately, the Penguins came 
to an agreement with Pittsburgh, thereby leaving Kansas 
City without a primary tenant for its new indoor arena. 
Had Kansas City successfully lured the Penguins, it would 
not have been the city’s first foray with an NHL franchise. 
Kansas City was awarded an NHL expansion team in the 
mid-1970s, but the team was sold after two seasons and 
relocated to Denver (“Penguins Explore,” 2007).
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Interestingly, cities with histories of a previously failed 
sport franchise frequently show interest in a new or relo-
cated team. As illustrated in Table 1, 13 professional teams 
(i.e., Major League Baseball [MLB], National Basketball 
Association [NBA], NFL, NHL) have relocated to new 
cities since 1990. Of the teams’ new cities, seven had a 
prior history of professional teams in the same sport. Fur-
thermore, of the teams’ old cities, five have attracted new 
franchises (either through expansion or relocation) since 
losing their teams.
Presently, the city of Los Angeles is actively pursuing a 
new or existing NFL team. Los Angeles is the second-larg-
est media market in the United States but has been with-
out an NFL team since 1995, when the Raiders and Rams 
relocated to Oakland and St. Louis, respectively (Farmer, 
2011). The centerpiece of the current proposal is Farmers 
Field, a $1.2-billion, 68,000-seat stadium located in down-
town Los Angeles (AEG, 2011). In July 2011, a memoran-
dum of understanding (MOU) called for the new stadium 
to be built on the site of the West Hall of the Los Angeles 
Convention Center and adjacent to the STAPLES Center, 
the home of the Lakers (NBA) and Kings (NHL). AEG 
either owns or has an ownership stake in the STAPLES 
Center, the Lakers, and the Kings. The MOU stated no 
public funds would be used to construct the stadium and 
the proposal would proceed only after an NFL team had 
been secured.
Although the stadium is being funded through private 
investment, the plan nevertheless requires substantial sup-
port from lawmakers and the surrounding communities. 
For example, some aspects of the deal require municipal 
cooperation, such as the city allowing its downtown land 
to be leased for $1. Additionally, approximately $275 mil-
lion in tax-exempt bonds would be used to construct a 
new wing for the convention center, and AEG would lease 
the building site (owned by the city of Los Angeles) for 
55 years. The proposal included a $700 million naming-
rights deal with Farmers Insurance. Furthermore, the sta-
dium would feature a wide range of technological innova-
tions and amenities. Under the original plan, construction 
would begin in 2013 and open in summer 2016, though 
that timeframe is no longer feasible due to the lack of an 
agreement. Despite the city’s history of failed professional 
football franchises, the significant investment required 
from both private and public entities in Los Angeles repre-
sents the belief that professional sport—and an innovative 
facility—are valued commodities.
As will be explained in further detail, the perceived 
utility of a professional football team and stadium to Los 
Angeles presents a paradox when past experiences are 
considered. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to 
explore the possible motives for lobbyists’ pursuit of a pro-
fessional sport team and stadium in a city that has histori-
cally lacked the support to sustain such ventures. Such a 
case provides perhaps the strongest illustration of the an-
ticipated benefits of professional sports and facilities to a 
community. That is, despite the fact that past Los Angeles 
professional football teams have failed to remain viable, 
current efforts to bring football back to the city indicate 
the perceived benefits outweigh the foreseen risks. Below, 
we provide a history of professional football in Los An-
geles and outline the city’s most recent attempt to attract 
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an NFL franchise. Next, we identify themes in the argu-
ments of pro-team lobbyists through a content analysis of 
the group’s official website and its social media platforms. 
These forms of media are centrally important to the or-
ganization’s perception-management strategies, which are 
employed in order to legitimate the stadium proposal. Le-
gitimation is rendered all the more necessary by the past 
failures in Los Angeles. Finally, we address the research 
and practical implications of our findings and frame an 
agenda for future research.
Past Failures in Los Angeles
Because Los Angeles and its surrounding areas are 
presently represented by multiple MLB, NBA, and NHL 
teams, market unsustainability does not seem to ad-
equately explain the city’s past failures with NFL fran-
chises. The rejection of the poor-market hypothesis—that 
a professional sports franchise is unsustainable under the 
city’s market conditions—is further supported by the fact 
a new team is currently being sought by a private, profit-
driven organization (AEG, 2013). A better explanation 
is that both the Raiders and Rams were unsatisfied with 
the condition of Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, which 
ultimately led to their relocations to Oakland and Ana-
heim, respectively, as discussed further below. As a result 
of these previous failures, the present Los Angeles stadium 
proposal is wholly premised on the presumed benefits and 
features of a new urban stadium.
In 1946, the Cleveland Rams moved operations to Los 
Angeles; the relocated Rams were the NFL’s first team west 
of the Mississippi River (Strong, 1996). The Rams played 
in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, the enormous sta-
dium built in the 1920s and the central site of the 1932 
and 1984 Olympic Games. With the capability of seating 
in excess of 100,000 spectators, the Coliseum presented 
attendance challenges for the Rams. Amid concerns that 
the team would move to a city with a smaller stadium, the 
Coliseum was renovated and its seating capacity reduced 
in the 1960s and 1970s (Munsey & Suppes, 2013). Despite 
these changes, the Rams moved their offices and training 
facility to nearby Anaheim, a city experiencing signifi-
cant economic growth during the Rams’ transition. The 
Rams competed in Anaheim Stadium (as the Los Angeles 
Rams) from 1980 until 1994, when they relocated to St. 
Louis. This move resulted from failed negotiations with 
Anaheim for stadium upgrades (St. Louis Rams, 2011).
In the early 1980s, Oakland Raiders owner Al Davis was 
seeking similar changes to the Oakland-Alameda County 
Coliseum, a stadium built in the mid-1960s and shared 
with MLB’s Athletics. Despite his concerns that Memorial 
Coliseum was too large and lacked sufficient luxury suites, 
Davis signed a memorandum of agreement with the Los 
Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission, thereby declar-
ing his intent to move the team to the Los Angeles venue. 
When the NFL and its members unanimously rejected the 
Raiders’ relocation to Los Angeles, Davis filed an antitrust 
lawsuit against the league and successfully argued his case 
that the NFL wrongfully obstructed the team’s relocation 
efforts (Lazaroff, 1984; Reich, 1989; Ross, 2003). While 
in Los Angeles, Davis lobbied for significant renovations 
to Memorial Coliseum, many of which were put on hold 
after a 1994 earthquake required the stadium commis-
sion to invest $93 million for critical repairs (University of 
Southern California, 2011). Seeking a more favorable sta-
dium for the Raiders, Davis entertained a number of offers 
from neighboring cities, including Irwindale, which made 
a $10-million nonrefundable payment to Davis as a sym-
bol of commitment to the Raiders; ultimately, Davis kept 
the money and moved the Raiders back to Oakland and 
the Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum (now known as 
O.co Coliseum) (“Irwindale Loses Big,” 1990).
Throughout the negotiation processes of both the Rams 
and Raiders, team owners were vocal about their concerns 
playing in the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, which 
had become outdated by the 1980s. Both teams struggled 
to sell out the stadium, leading often to telecast blackouts. 
Additionally, the configuration of the stadium seating was 
not optimal for viewing a football game and lacked many 
modern amenities, including luxury seating, which was 
increasingly becoming a relied-upon revenue source for 
NFL teams (Connell & Glick, 1986). Finally, team officials 
were concerned about the Coliseum’s location in south-
central Los Angeles because of the perception of criminal 
activity as well as the lack of parking (Euchner, 1993).
Farmers Field Project
Stakeholders advocating for sport facility upgrades may 
put forth a number of arguments to demonstrate their need. 
To the organization, an outdated facility represents lost po-
tential revenue from corporate sales, increased attendance, 
personal seat licenses, concessions, parking, and sponsorship 
(Brown, Nagel, McEvoy, & Rascher, 2004; Crompton, How-
ard, & Var, 2003; Zygmont & Leadley, 2005). In addition to the 
benefits to the team, pro-facility supporters may also identify 
community benefits, including increased jobs and economic 
stimulation (Coates, 2007; Schwester, 2007), higher property 
values (Dehring, Depken, & Ward, 2007), elevated civic pride 
(Broudehoux, 2007), improved fan enjoyment (Swindell & 
Rosentraub, 1998), enhanced city status (Owen, 2003), in-
creased visibility to outside corporations (Phelps, 2004), and 
positive media exposure (Crompton, 2004).
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Many of the aforementioned arguments were used by 
advocates of the present-day Los Angeles proposal. As 
discussed in the section below, the proposed stadium dif-
fers from its predecessor in a number of ways and includes 
amenities sorely missed by the Rams and Raiders in Me-
morial Coliseum. Still, with the city’s history of failed 
professional football ventures, its repeated interest in at-
tracting an NFL team is compelling and warrants further 
investigation to ascertain if and why Angelenos believe 
this project would result in a different outcome than expe-
rienced by the city’s previous professional football teams.
After the Rams and Raiders left the Los Angeles area 
in 1995, the city—with the cooperation of the NFL — 
almost immediately began plans to attract an existing 
or expansion team. In 1999, the NFL all but guaranteed 
Los Angeles an expansion team as long as the city could 
present a stadium construction and financing plan by the 
league’s deadline. As noted by Kolker (1999), however, the 
city lacked enthusiasm when faced with the prospect of 
regaining an NFL franchise: “Los Angeles…has proved 
blasé about pro football, slow to form stadium or parking 
plans, sluggish before informal NFL deadlines, adamant 
against public funding for teams” (p. 1). After Los Angeles 
failed to meet the NFL’s stadium-plan deadline, the league 
awarded its expansion franchise to Houston (Williams, 
McClain, Hanson, Schwartz, & Bernstein, 1999). For the 
past decade, the NFL has sought to reenter the region’s 
lucrative media market, and a number of reasons might 
explain why the league has been unsuccessful thus far. As 
Alexander (2007) contended, the NFL’s most likely obsta-
cle has been overcoming local citizens’ steadfast opposi-
tion to public stadium financing. 
Recently, several competing plans have emerged that 
limits the public’s investment in a new stadium. One such 
plan spearheaded by Majestic Realty Co. has called for a 
75,000-seat stadium to be built in nearby City of Industry 
(Farmer, 2009). However, that plan has been criticized for 
its lack of a cohesive financing plan and limited oppor-
tunity for revenue generation (Markazi, 2011b). Conse-
quently, much of the public’s attention has turned to the 
AEG-led Farmers Field plan (Farmer, 2013).
The Farmers Field project (FFP) received endorse-
ments from a wide range of individuals and groups, in-
cluding elected officials (e.g., former mayor James Hahn; 
current mayor Antonio Villaraigosa), business leaders 
and local chambers of commerce (e.g., Greater Los An-
geles African American Chamber of Commerce; National 
Association of Women Business Owners), labor unions 
(e.g., Laborers’ International Union of North America, 
Local 300), and sports celebrities (e.g., former Laker Mag-
ic Johnson; commentator Al Michaels) (AEG, 2011). In 
September 2011, California governor Jerry Brown par-
ticipated in a ceremony with AEG to sign Senate Bill (SB) 
292. The bill helped expedite the FFP by accelerating the 
environmental-certification review process required of 
major construction projects in California (Siders, 2011). 
Despite these highly publicized project endorsements, 
the FFP also faced several criticisms, including concerns 
that nearby neighborhoods and the downtown homeless 
have been ignored during the planning process (Linthi-
cum, 2011; Tobar, 2011); that AEG’s lease with the city un-
fairly benefits AEG (Lopez, 2011); that additional traffic 
would hinder travel (Zahniser & Farmer, 2011); that the 
proposed stadium would incur greater economic benefits 
outside the downtown area (Kotkin, 2011); and the plan 
affronts California’s pro-environmental legislation (Futch, 
2011; Hiltzkik, 2011; McGreevy, 2011).
The FFP today is at a critical stage of development. As 
per NFL regulations, AEG must show evidence of a vi-
able plan to finance and construct a stadium before the 
league will consider potential teams or ownership groups. 
Such a plan requires the commitment of a number of 
constituents, including state and local officials. Similarly, 
AEG must address the concerns of numerous entities, in-
cluding the citizens of Los Angeles, local business leaders, 
and the media. While public scrutiny is expected of any 
mega project, the FFP is particularly susceptible to criti-
cism given Los Angeles’s historical lack of support (as evi-
denced by poor attendance and an unwillingness to reno-
vate existing or construct new stadiums) for its football 
teams. Therefore, FFP officials must find ways to temper 
concerns about the city’s past professional football failures 
and to respond to new issues raised about the stadium 
project. Through an examination of the pro-stadium mar-
keting communications, we identified the salient themes 
emerging from AEG’s FFP campaign. These themes rep-
resent AEG’s central arguments for securing an NFL fran-
chise and building Farmers Field.
AEG’s Perception Management Agenda
AEG is charged with demonstrating the financial sus-
tainability of a professional football team and downtown 
stadium, a particular challenge considering the fates of 
Los Angeles’s past NFL teams. Therefore, one of AEG’s 
primary objectives is to distinguish the FFP from similar 
endeavors. As noted by Elsbach (2006), an entity seeking 
to cultivate, manage, or modify its reputation and image 
can engage in organizational perception management 
(OPM). OPM is a multidimensional process through 
which perceptions of the organization (held by internal 
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and external audiences) are influenced by a variety of ac-
tions by organizational spokespersons. 
OPM is a useful framework through which the Los 
Angeles football initiative can be examined. As described 
above, the historical lack of support for professional foot-
ball in Los Angeles necessitates that any new proposal 
consider ways to differentiate its plan from past failures. 
A primary means through which the reputation of AEG 
and the FFP can be controlled is the careful management 
of direct communications. These verbal accounts are the 
subject of this study, as described in further detail below.
Methodology
The method utilized in this work followed the ap-
proach employed by Mondello et al. (2009). Specifically, 
we examined AEG’s primary foci: the features and per-
ceived contributions of the FFP. Using content analysis, 
we analyzed AEG’s official Farmers Field website (i.e., 
farmersfield.com) and its three primary social media 
sites (i.e., Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube), whose links 
were embedded within the primary website. These AEG-
controlled messages included a variety of news clips, en-
dorsements, and strategies to highlight the need for a new 
stadium initiative. Collectively, this information provided 
the key data points for our content analysis. Specifically, 
the social media analyzed included 178 statements posted 
on Farmers Field’s official Facebook page from April to 
November 2011, 912 Twitter messages posted on its offi-
cial microblog account between November 2010 and No-
vember 2011, and 29 YouTube videos posted on its official 
YouTube channel from April to November 2011.
In recent years social-networking communities have 
developed as a promising resource for marketers due to 
the low cost and relative ease with which information can 
be disseminated. A recent study by the Center for Mar-
keting Research at the University of Massachusetts Dart-
mouth revealed 75% of the 500 fastest-growing private 
companies in the United States are “very familiar” with 
social networking media (Barnes, 2010). Furthermore, 
the study found 91% of the companies researched are 
using at least one form of social networking (including 
blogs, podcasts, online videos, message boards, wikis, and 
social networking sites such as Facebook, MySpace, and 
LinkedIn). Of the companies currently engaged in social 
networking, 87% reported their social networking activity 
was successful. A similar incidence of social-networking 
usage occurs in North America’s four most prominent 
professional sport leagues. Of the 122 professional sports 
teams comprising North America’s four most prominent 
professional sport leagues, 93% provide access to their of-
ficial Facebook groups from their website homepages, 
while 95% of the teams promote their Twitter feeds in 
the same manner.
Following the guidelines of Fico, Lacy, and Riffe 
(2008), we grouped “expressions” into categories 
through the development of a multi-stage coding pro-
tocol. In the first stage, primary expressions from the 
primary website’s content area were categorized ac-
cording to a number of recurring themes found in the 
literature. The primary website’s relationship with each 
social media outlet is perhaps best described as the an-
chor; that is, from our analysis of each medium, we ob-
served that nearly all social media posts were designed 
with the intent of redirecting the reader back to the 
anchor website, providing the key features of the FFP 
emphasized by AEG. Each theme and its operational 
definition are provided in the results section. Following 
the identification of the primary themes, each social 
media post was analyzed and assigned, when appli-
cable, to the aforementioned themes. When necessary, 
posts were coded into multiple themes. Additionally, if 
a post could not be assigned to an already identified 
theme, we considered the appropriateness of develop-
ing a new theme.
Two coders were used. To ensure coding reliability, if 
there was inter-coder disagreement or intra-coder un-
certainty as to the coding of a posting, it was removed 
from the analysis. Because of our interest in the manner 
in which AEG is positioning the FFP (through OPM), 
the investigation of the developer’s official Internet out-
lets is appropriate. Unlike the independent news me-
dia, these authorized mediums represent one of the few 
channels that can be wholly controlled by AEG. Thus, 
the primary themes extracted for our analysis indicate 
AEG’s major points of emphasis regarding the FFP. 
These points are necessary for a number of reasons, in-
cluding lending legitimacy to the campaign to return 
professional football to Los Angeles.
Results
During the first stage of content analysis, three broad 
themes emerged from a review of the FFP anchor web-
site. These themes represent AEG’s central objectives 
in communicating to the public and include: educating 
the public about the project; connecting to hopeful NFL 
fans and, more broadly, to Angelenos; and legitimating 
the project as a viable and worthy contribution to the 
city. Furthermore, during the second stage of content 
analysis (in which social media communications were 
categorized), a fourth theme emerged. Especially while 
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the plan was in its infancy stage, AEG stressed the im-
portance of advocacy by calling to action those who 
supported the initiative. These findings are reported in 
Table 2 below.
When the 29 YouTube videos were examined, multi-
ple themes emerged and were often embedded within a 
single video clip. For example, individuals endorsing the 
project typically gave multiple reasons for their support. 
These factors included job growth, the civic pride associ-
ated with an NFL team and entertainment center, and the 
need for an updated convention center. At the end of each 
video, the FFP theme (“It’s about jobs. It’s about pride. It’s 
about time.”) was reiterated to viewers. This slogan was 
also displayed prominently on the Farmers Field website.
Across all three social media sites, 1,119 social media 
communications were analyzed during the second stage 
of review, and 1,099 total communications were catego-
rized (while 21 were left unclassified due to the lack of 
specificity in their messages). A number of posts con-
tained multiple categorizations, suggesting AEG’s broad 
impression-management strategies. In sum, 1,456 catego-
rizations were made. Perhaps most obviously, AEG has 
relied on its online resources to educate citizens about the 
FFP (N=374). The depth of information provided ranged 
from broad to specific. Four subcategories were developed 
to more precisely illustrate AEG’s educational initiatives. 
General information (n=160) encompassed a variety of 
messages related both to the stadium itself (e.g., size, cost, 
location) and details surrounding the FFP’s development 
(e.g., “AEG, LA City & @ConventionLA has chosen ar-
chitect @Populous to design the new Convention Center 
Hall #FarmersField”). Financing plan (n=34) included in-
formation related to the funding apparatuses planned to 
develop and construct the stadium (e.g., “#FarmersField 
will by paid for by the PRIVATE sector-AEG”). The stadi-
um’s planned pro-environmental design (n=55) was simi-
larly emphasized (e.g., “The new #FarmersField stadium 
will be one of the most environmentally friendly stadiums 
in the world”). Lastly, AEG provided miscellaneous press 
links (n=125) when well-known media outlets provided 
favorable news reports (e.g., “Check out the Los Angeles 
Times article on the Farmers Field project reaching the 
next level in bringing the NFL to L.A.”).
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While online content can be a significant source of 
information, much of the appeal of social media is its 
interactive capabilities. For AEG, the Farmers Field an-
chor website and social media sites provided means for 
connecting to both football fans and Angelenos in gen-
eral, as evidenced by AEG’s online posts (N=354). AEG 
sought to incite football fans by making NFL team ref-
erences (n=146) (e.g., “What an amazing NFL opener! 
Great game-next year, I want it in LA @FarmersField @
NFLinLA”). Despite the relative ease with which the FFP 
could resonate with football fans, additional outreach 
would be necessary to demonstrate the value to parts of 
the population with no interest in a professional football 
team. To connect to these Angelenos, online posts often 
touted the economic benefits (n=88) Farmers Field could 
provide (e.g., “The approval of Farmers Field brings us 
one step closer to thousands of jobs for L.A. and a boost 
to the economy”).
Additionally, AEG highlighted other aspects of the 
FFP benefitting the city’s image, such as the Los Angeles 
Convention Center improvements (n=54) representing a 
significant portion of the plan (e.g., “The Farmers Field 
project allows L.A. to finally compete for many of the top 
50 conventions the current Los Angeles Convention Cen-
ter is too small to host”). To appeal to those who may en-
joy alternative forms of entertainment, social media posts 
sometimes discussed the potential new entertainment op-
tions (n=38) that would be found in the stadium when the 
NFL team was not playing (“Are you watching tonight’s 
fight? Mayweather vs. Ortiz! Who do you think will win? 
How great would it be to see Pacquiao fight Mayweath-
er at Farmers Field!?”). In response to the worry that a 
downtown stadium would contribute to traffic problems, 
the FFP social media posts highlighted the infrastruc-
tural changes (n=27) aimed at addressing these issues 
(“[Downtown Los Angeles] has the traffic infrastructure 
to support #FarmersField”).
In light of Los Angeles’s history of past professional foot-
ball failures, AEG has been challenged to demonstrate the 
ways in which this endeavor is different. To allay trepidation 
based on the city’s history, AEG placed significant emphasis 
on the events legitimizing their plan (N=444). One useful 
function of social media outlets such as Twitter is the abil-
ity to “liveblog” a special event (n=264), or provide running 
commentary during the event (e.g., “At @FarmersField 
press conference with @JerryBrownGov.”). Additionally, 
AEG illustrated the perceived legitimacy of the plan by ref-
erencing the numerous individuals and groups providing 
endorsements (n=180) for the FFP (e.g., “Former Laker 
Legend Earvin ‘Magic’ Johnson supports Farmers Field!”).
Finally, AEG benefited from the interactivity of social 
media by calling to action their supporters (N=140). In 
addition to signing online petitions or registering for more 
information, AEG requested that pro-FFP supporters ac-
tively advocate for the plan (e.g., “Help move the #Farmer-
sField project forward by contacting the L.A. City Council 
asking them to support @FarmersField!”). Below, we con-
clude with a discussion of AEG’s perception-management 
strategies and suggest directions for future research.
Discussion
Each of the themes emerging from the content analy-
sis provides a unique objective of AEG’s OPM strategies. 
In addition to educating the public about general features 
of the stadium project, AEG also focused on publiciz-
ing two major aspects of the FFP. In anticipation of criti-
cisms raised from perceptions that the stadium would be 
funded at least in part by public subsidies, social media 
communications focused on the fact the project would be 
paid wholly through private investiture. Distinguishing 
the FFP as a privately funded stadium is essential in light 
of the passionate debates occurring in cities where sub-
sidized sports facilities have been proposed. These cases 
have been widely documented in both the scholarly litera-
ture (e.g., Brown & Paul, 2002; deMause & Cagan, 2008; 
Mondello & Anderson, 2004) and national media (e.g., 
Bakst, 2011; Belson, 2011a, 2011b; Bergen, 2011; Sachdev, 
2010). Given the fact the majority of North American 
sports facilities are funded through local, state, or federal 
subsidies, AEG is utilizing its website and social media 
outlets to combat public assumptions that the FFP would 
require municipal funding.
The FFP’s incorporation of environmentally sustain-
able design features is also a focal point of AEG’s educa-
tory initiatives. When SB 292—the legislation designed to 
expedite the judicial process through which a proposed 
facility’s environmental design is reviewed—was initially 
proposed, it was met with strong opposition from en-
vironmental groups, including the National Resources 
Defense Council (NRDC) (Pettit, 2011). According to 
its advocates, SB 292 accelerated the unnecessarily long 
and arduous environmental review required under the 
provisions of California’s Environmental Quality Act. To 
opponents, however, SB 292 would “give AEG a break on 
lawsuits associated with its stadium and make it extremely 
difficult for communities to sue to force AEG to protect 
the livability and environment near the stadium” (Futch, 
2011, para. 13). After revisions were made to the original 
bill, SB 292 passed with the support of the NRDC, the Cal-
ifornia League of Conservation Voters, and the Los Ange-
les Times. By focusing on messages acclaiming the FFP’s 
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pro-environmental design (e.g., “Transportation plans for 
the stadium would give #FarmersField the lowest ‘cars per 
football game ticket holder’ ratio in the country”; “Under 
the bill, #FarmersField will become one of the only NFL 
stadiums in the United States to have a net zero carbon 
footprint”), AEG is continuing to demonstrate its com-
mitment to pro-environmental initiatives. This strategy is 
essential to tempering criticisms that SB 292 allowed the 
stadium project to circumvent environmental reviews.
In addition to educating the public about the stadium 
initiative, AEG sought to form connections with both foot-
ball and non-football fans. Frequent references to the 2011 
NFL season were directed toward those with an interest 
in professional football. To attract nonfans, social media 
communications also focused on planned improvements 
to the convention center and named a variety of other 
events that could be hosted at Farmers Field, including 
boxing matches, concerts, major collegiate sports cham-
pionships, and motocross racing. To professional sport 
organizations, a new arena or stadium represents a new 
way of attracting individuals traditionally uninterested 
in sport; for example, Kellison and Kim (in press) found 
that teams playing in pro-environmental arenas sought to 
market to environmentally conscientious consumers in 
order to stimulate new interest in the team.
In light of Los Angeles’s past failures with professional 
football franchises, critics have raised questions about 
whether the current stadium proposal would be success-
ful. To address concerns about the FFP’s legitimacy and 
professional football’s long-term sustainability in Los An-
geles, AEG included the endorsements of a number of 
prominent business leaders, celebrities, labor unions, and 
politicians in its social media communications. During 
the initial planning stages to build a stadium in Los Ange-
les (and prior to the development of the FFP), then-Gov-
ernor Arnold Schwarzenegger was among the most vocal 
supporters, paying particular attention to a new stadium’s 
pro-environmental design: “This stadium is also a model 
of environmental efficiency. …This stadium is so innova-
tive that it is, literally, and I’m very proud to say, the first 
LEED-certified stadium in the [NFL]” (Schwarzenegger, 
2010). Although officials have made assurances the stadi-
um would be financed wholly through non-public means, 
their need to establish legitimacy in the community is 
nevertheless essential in order to “manage perceptions of 
long-term and enduring identities and reputations” (Els-
bach, 2006, pp. 34–35).
Finally, during various planning stages of the FFP, 
AEG’s social media messages encouraged supporters to 
show signs of support for the stadium initiative. Advo-
cates were asked to sign petitions, contact local political 
leaders, and attend rallies. Additionally, to further legiti-
mate the proposal, live-blogs of public hearings and meet-
ings often emphasized the large numbers of supporters 
in attendance. Thus, by calling to action the thousands of 
stadium supporters, the FFP could be legitimated to criti-
cal decision makers, including apprehensive politicians, 
prospective team owners, and NFL administrators. Each 
of these groups plays an important role in the success of 
the FFP; a final city approval was initially targeted for June 
2012 and a lease with a relocated team would be signed 
in early 2013 but those dates have now been pushed back 
(Markazi, 2011a).
These negotiations are noteworthy for several reasons. 
Because of Los Angeles’s past football failures, subsequent 
plans designed to attract a professional football team have 
been met with criticism. As a result of concerns that the 
FFP may be similarly unsuccessful (cf. Romero, 2011), 
AEG must legitimate its plan for a new stadium. As elabo-
rated above, AEG’s social media messages have focused 
on educating Angelenos about the stadium itself (i.e., 
features, financing plan), connecting to both football fans 
and nonfans, legitimating the long-term sustainability of 
the project, and calling advocates to act on the FFP’s be-
half.
Conclusions
Future research should consider whether Angelenos 
value the purported benefits of the stadium project. While 
there indeed may be evidence that professional football 
and Farmers Field could provide non-economic benefits 
to Los Angeles, similar attempts to quantify these in other 
cities have been absent from the scholarly literature until 
recently. Over the last decade, sports economists have uti-
lized the contingent valuation method (CVM) to quantify 
the externalities produced by sport teams. Originating in 
environmental economics, CVM assesses user willingness 
to pay for goods or services that are not publicly traded on 
the open market. Specifically, this methodology presents 
respondents with hypothetical scenarios and then calcu-
lates both individual and group willingness to pay esti-
mates (cf., Walker & Mondello, 2007).
Over the last 20 years, a proliferation of empirical sport 
management studies has examined the economic im-
pact of stadiums and sporting events on local economies. 
Though the overwhelming majority of these analyses have 
consistently reported minimal and in some cases negative 
economic impact, various stakeholders (including city of-
ficials, professional sports teams’ owners and policy mak-
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the great stadium swindle turns public money into pri-
vate profit. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.
Elsbach, K. D. (2006). Organizational perception man-
agement. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 
Inc.
Euchner, C. C. (1993). Playing the field: Why sports 
ers, and international sport representatives) have contin-
ued to claim these sports events and stadiums represent 
sound financial policy. However, within the last decade, 
as additional work continued to support the notion that 
sports and stadiums may not be economically beneficial 
to municipalities, stakeholders began promoting the non-
pecuniary benefits of sports. These positive public goods 
and externalities include civic pride and having a city con-
sidered “major league.”
Our analysis of the Los Angeles FFP’s social media 
communications indicates stadium planners are dissemi-
nating a wide range of messages to enable support for the 
plan. This review of perception-management strategies 
provides a review of organizationally managed and au-
thored messages designed to enhance the project’s repu-
tation. Despite the city’s historical lack of support, the 
FFP represents a significant investment in the long-term 
sustainability of professional football in Los Angeles. As 
this case continues to evolve, other cities with similar cir-
cumstances (e.g., cities that have lost professional sport 
franchises) should be cognizant of the FFP’s successes 
and failures. Should the FFP proceed as planned, similar 
promotional strategies may produce a similar fate, one in 
which a professional sport franchise emerges only through 
enduring leadership, the support of highly visible leaders 
and ordinary citizens alike, and a plan to differentiate itself 
from past failures.
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